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The Political Background 
In late February 1359, David II returned to Scotland from a month-long diplomatic 
mission to London which had cost him at least £666.
2
 It is clear that his aim on this trip 
had been to revive the plan which, as Professor Duncan has shown, the second Bruce king 
of Scots had first proposed to Edward III between 1349 and 1352: namely, to secure his 
release from the English captivity which had resulted from his capture in battle at 
Neville‘s Cross in 1346, not by paying a large ransom, but instead by recognising a 
younger son of the English king as his heir presumptive to the Scottish throne, in the 
event of his failure to sire a Bruce heir.
3
 
That plan had first been rejected resoundingly by a majority of the Scottish 
political community in a Parliament at Scone in February 1352. At that time, the 
Lieutenancy of Scotland in the king‘s absence was held by Robert the Steward, David‘s 
half-nephew and Scottish heir presumptive, who had been recognised as the Bruce 
dynasty‘s successor-in-waiting by Acts of Succession in 1318 and 1326. By 1341, the 
Steward had emerged as David‘s chief domestic antagonist and, along with Patrick earl of 
March, had infamously abandoned the king to his fate on the battlefield near Durham in 
1346. In February 1352, the Steward was able to rouse considerable Scottish opposition 
to David‘s apparently Anglophile plan by deploying rhetoric about the sacrifices which 
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had been made in the long wars against the Plantagenets and the tradition of active 
alliance with France. But this also enabled Robert Steward to defend his own political 
position as heir to David‘s throne and as the dominant territorial noble of central 
Scotland. In the end, in October 1357, David was only able to secure his release by 
promising to pay England a ransom of 100,000 merks (£66,666) over ten years (and even 
then only after the French king, John II, had also been captured by Edward III‘s forces at 
Poitiers in September 1356).4 
However, David still clearly viewed the younger-son plan as a gamble worth 
taking to avoid a crippling financial burden and, far more importantly, to help him 
reassert royal power at home over self-made Scottish magnates like the Steward. Thus in 
late December 1358 or January 1359, just over a year after his release, he returned to 
London in person with up to forty attendants, lodging at the capital‘s Blackfriars. There – 
with the help of his Queen, Joan, Edward III‘s sister – David arranged by 12 February 
(confirmed on the 21
st
) for a postponement of the next ransom payment of 10,000 merks 
from St John the Baptist‘s Day (24 June) 1359 until December that year.
5
 Yet it is also 
clear that behind the scenes David put the succession offer back on the negotiating table 
with a definite view to securing Edward III‘s third son, John of Gaunt, earl of Richmond, 
as his heir presumptive in return for the full cancellation of his ransom. It was David‘s 
intention thereafter to return to Scotland and sell this plan to his subjects. 
But when he got home things seem to have gone badly wrong. David‘s first 
surviving act after his return journey dates from 28 February at Scone, suggesting perhaps 
that the king intended to hold a Council or Parliament upon his arrival to promote his 
plan. He would have found several of his most significant subjects – especially the 
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Steward – extremely unwilling to attend such a meeting. Instead, David had to content 
himself at Scone with granting the castle-barony of Urquhart to his brother-in-law, 
William, earl of Sutherland, and his son, John. Young John Sutherland (d. c. 1361), 
David‘s full nephew, was a noble heir whom later Scottish chroniclers would assert 
David had already mooted as a possible alternative heir instead of his half-nephew, the 
Steward.
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 But a fortnight later, on 15 March 1359, David was at Edinburgh in the 
company of several of the men who had accompanied him on his recent embassy to 
London. William de Landellis bishop of St Andrews, Patrick de Leuchars bishop of 
Brechin and Chancellor, Sir Robert Erskine, Sir Hugh Eglintoun, Sir Archibald ‗the 
Grim‘ Douglas and Sir John Preston all witnessed David‘s charter of the Dumfriesshire 
barony of Terregles to a member of his favoured chivalric cadre, John Herries, esquire, 
who would go to England on the king‘s business in July 1359. These lands had first been 
resigned to the crown by Thomas, earl of Mar, the king‘s cousin (and next in line to the 
throne after the Stewarts) who had also been on the embassy to London. However, these 
men were joined at Edinburgh by the Steward and William, first earl of Douglas. These 
two would lead the opposition to David‘s diplomatic plans: the first concerned to protect 
his royal succession; the second to preserve hostility to England and alliance with France; 
and both anxious to avoid the restoration to Scottish lands and titles of the Disinherited – 
those families exiled to England by the Bruces since 1314 - as part of any deal with 
Edward III. Indeed, as Douglas still controlled Edinburgh castle and was Justiciar south of 
Forth, at this meeting in March 1359 they may already have begun to bring pressure to 




This certainly seems to be what happened after David attempted to push his plan 
through finally at a Council held at Dundee in early April. There, on the 5
th
 of that month, 
David issued a remarkable charter granting the earldom of Moray to Henry de Grosmont, 
Duke of Lancaster, Edward III‘s leading general, who was also just about to become the 
father-in-law of John of Gaunt.
8
 To do so must first have required the king to take Moray 
back from Patrick, earl of March, whom he had recognised as heir to the core of the 
former Randolph regality in 1357, but who had been ‗captured‘ by the crown in late 1358 
on unspecified charges (perhaps relating to deforcement of exchequer officials collecting 
taxes for David‘s ransom).
9
 It was probably David‘s hope that his dramatic re-grant of 
Moray in April 1359 – which could have been agreed with Lancaster, Gaunt and Edward 
III while David was in London – would give Gaunt, as the husband of the aging 
Lancaster‘s second daughter and co-heiress, a stake in Scotland: this might make it easier 
for David‘s subjects to accept the Prince as Scotland‘s royal heir.10  
Yet it can be speculated that this grant was a dead letter within a matter of hours 
of its inception. Beginning on the same day – 5 April – and continuing for the next few 
weeks, David seems to have been obliged to issue a number of further acts favouring the 
Steward, the earl of Douglas and their supporters. This was a pattern of behaviour which 
broke completely with David‘s usual partisan direction of patronage to his supporters and 
to the total exclusion of these great magnates.
11
 In this context, it is possible that, angered 
by David‘s attempts on 5 April to once more alter the succession, admit Gaunt and seek 
peace with England, the Steward, Douglas and others quickly joined together to resist and 
intimidate the king, forcing him to change tack. 
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Certainly, having expended so much personal energy and money in drawing up 
this deal with Edward III, it seems unlikely that David II would have willingly done a 
volte-face, abandoned the Gaunt scheme, and sought alliance with France. Admittedly, 
David would contemplate the shrewd alternative of a revived French alliance in 1369. But 
by that year there were many new reasons to compel David to change direction: John II of 
France – Edward III‘s captive between 1356 and 1361 – was dead and England was 
already at war with his Valois successor, Charles V; David had not paid any of his 
ransom since 1360; and Anglo-Scottish talks about a ransom-succession deal, ongoing 
between 1360 and 1364 and again 1365-7, had apparently stalled.12 However, by June 
1359, only three months after David‘s return from his first personal embasy to England, a 
secret treaty had been concluded by the Scots with the then Dauphin Charles.  
The text of this treaty makes it clear that a Scottish embassy of May-June 1359 
had sought to persuade the French to pay off the remaining 90,000 merks of David‘s 
ransom, allowing Scotland to reactivate its alliance with France and make ‗bonne et forte‘ 
war on Edward III. In the end the French only agreed to give the Scots 50,000 merks by 
April 1360. The money was to be transferred to the Scots through the Augustinian church 
in Bruges. In 1355 some 40,000 French gold écus (about £10,000) had been paid in the 
same way to the Scottish nobility under the Steward‘s Lieutenancy by John II, to induce 
them to aid a French expedition in Scotland to attack northern England. By the terms of 
the 1359 treaty the Scots were again expected to attack England, although there were also 
vague promises given of up to a thousand French troops (500 archers and 500 men-at-
arms) to serve in Scotland. Significantly, French aid to ensure the full payment of David‘s 
ransom, and the same number of French troops promised to Scotland, would again form 
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the terms of secret agreements with France which the Steward would make in March 
1371 – just a month after David‘s death and Steward‘s accession as Robert II - and again 
in August 1383. These French connections thus appear to be consistent Stewart policies 
between 1355 and John de Vienne‘s ill-fated expedition to Scotland in 1385.
13
 
It might be inferred from the collective weight of this suggestive evidence that in 
spring and summer 1359 Robert Steward and others obliged David II, against his will – or 
in the face of massive anti-English opinion roused at the April Dundee Council – to seek 
secret alliance with France. The unusual wording and nature of the commission which 
David issued to the three Scottish envoys sent to Paris seems to confirm this pressure. It 
is reproduced and translated here as a previously unpublished act of the king to add to Mr 
Bruce Webster‘s splendid Regesta volume. The letter of 10 May 1359, issued once more 
from the Douglas-held castle of Edinburgh, empowers the envoys to renew the Franco-
Scottish alliance: their agreement was to be binding upon ‗the aforesaid king of Scotland, 
or his lieutenant, or any other person or persons who hold sufficient authority for this.‘ 
This remarkable clause - although it might possibly have been included to deal with the 
eventuality of David re-entering English captivity if future ransom payment was disrupted 
- could in theory have enabled the Steward to marginalise the king and to once more act 
as lieutenant of the realm. In doing so, the Steward and others could have provided 
themselves with a precedent for the noble rebellion against David of 1363. In the spring 
of that year, the Steward, Douglas and March – enraged by David‘s non-payment of his 
ransom and mistreatment of noble hostages to England – were provoked into action by 
the king‘s plans to both try once again to change the succession through a deal with 
England and to redraw the map of Scottish lordship to his advantage. According to John 
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of Fordun‘s anonymous contemporary source, the three earls rose up in 1363 with the 
intention of: 
Bending him [David] to their views . . . or of banishing him . . . to gain their ends 
through force or fear.
14
  
Both this attempt to forcibly marginalise the authority of the crown, and that of 1359, also 
provided templates for the political coups of 1384, 1388 and 1402, when magnates 




 The men chosen to go to Paris in 1359 also suggest that the secret French alliance 
was a course contrary to David‘s wishes. Sir Robert Erskine (a Renfrewshire tenant of the 
Steward, able to play him off against the king for his own gain), Sir John le Grant and 
Norman Leslie were not the usual official body of one bishop, one earl, one baron but 
instead are described as ‗faithful confidential representatives‘. Yet in spring 1359 they 
were not committed Crown men. Erskine had been Chamberlain c. 1348-51 and was an 
exchequer auditor in March 1359. But in May-July 1359, he and his associates were 
probably not acting in France as Scottish financial officers under the direction of the 
Chamberlain since mid-1358, namely Thomas, earl of Mar. Remarkably, on 24 February 
1359, Mar had agreed to become the liege man of Edward III and to serve him in his 
French wars. This was probably done with the approval of David II, for an Anglo-Scottish 
alliance of some sort would form part of all the succession-ransom deals proposed by 
David between 1349 and 1367. But Mar‘s bond with Edward III does suggest that in 1359 
this earl may have been eased out for a while as Chamberlain by the man he himself had 
replaced in 1358, Thomas Stewart, earl of Angus, a kinsman and deputy of the Steward as 
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King‘s Lieutenant in the years 1351-7, and a man keen on alliance with France. By 1359, 




As for the 1359 envoys‘ personal motives, Leslie, certainly, had been a deputy of 
Angus as Chamberlain c. 1351-8, but had lost his office sometime before March 1359, 
about the time Mar took over. After securing the French alliance in June, Leslie and 
Erskine went on to Avignon and persuaded the Pope, by 9 August 1359, to change his 
mind about granting David a clerical tenth for three years to help pay the ransom, a 
windfall the king was happy to exploit.
17
 But Leslie, a crusader who was strongly 
attracted to David‘s chivalric court along with his brother, the bold (and mercenary) Sir 
Walter Leslie, is reported to have been captured in battle by the English in France in 
1360.
18
 The third envoy, John le Grant, had been a Randolph man as keeper of Darnaway 
forest in Moray and had thereafter become a Mar adherent; but he had followed William, 
Lord (by 1358 earl) of Douglas, to fight at Poitiers. In 1359 Grant may have felt his role 
in Moray threatened by the Lancaster grant and although he does not seem to have 
actually participated in the final talks in France for the secret alliance, David would 
retaliate after 1360 by denying him a £40 royal pension and replacing him as Darnaway‘s 
forester with another of the royal chivalric cadre, Richard Comyn esquire, only for the 
Steward as Robert II to restore Grant in 1371.
19
 Finally, although Erskine very obviously 
became David II‘s key political fixer and envoy to England after 1362, he did not win the 
king‘s complete trust and direct royal patronage until 1360.
20
  
 David was vulnerable in 1359, being childless and estranged from Queen Joan 
who had returned to England where she would die in 1362. It would take the king a 
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number of weeks in 1359 - really until mid- to late- summer - to shake off the influence 
of the Steward, Angus, Douglas and others and to begin to win over the loyalty of men 
like Erskine and Leslie and possession of Edinburgh castle. In recovering his political 
autonomy, David was probably also extremely lucky that the secret Franco-Scottish 
alliance was almost immediately just as dead a letter as his own grant of the earldom of 
Moray to the house of Lancaster. The Scottish embassy of June 1359 was timely and  
clearly found the Dauphin Charles extremely keen to make alternative diplomatic plans. 
Draft indentures concluded with England in London on 18 May 1358 and then on 24 
March 1359 had made it obvious that the cost of recovering the humiliated John II, with 
whom the Dauphin had strained relations, would be massive: the cession of almost half of 
France with full sovereignty to Edward III (who would give up his claim to the Valois 
kingship), a ransom of up to £666,666, hostages and the abandonment of alliances 
directed against England, including that with the Scots. Indeed, so unpalatable were these 
English demands that the French Estates-General rejected them on 25 May 1359, just 
days before the arrival of the Scottish embassy.  But long before Erskine (though 
probably not Leslie) could return from France via the papacy to Scotland - presumably 
about September 1359 - to present the secret French alliance for ratification by the king 
and the estates, David had extricated himself from Stewart-Douglas pressure. By then it 
must also have been apparent that the Dauphin Charles and the war-weary French would 
have little or no choice but to conclude a deal with England for the release of their king 
and that he would not honour the secret pact with the Scots: John II would indeed be 




 David may thus have suffered a major scare and setback to his diplomatic and 
domestic agenda in 1359. It would take him fully three years before he was able to try 
once again to go in person to London in 1362-3 to revive the succession-ransom deal. 
That plan too would provoke a violent threat to remove the king in spring 1363 and 




Note on Diplomatic. 
David II‘s letter of 10 May 1359 survives as a transcription about three quarters of the 
way through the French copy of the treaty of June 1359 (Archives Nationales J677 nos. 7,  
8. Photograph held at National Archives of Scotland, RH1/2/853), where it is presented as 
an inspection of the Dauphin Charles, and following a similar inspection of the French 
appointment of ambassadors for the negotiations on 15 June. There are a number of 
points which make this document stand out as unusual for royal documents of this period, 
and which create suspicion about the background to its creation. The first point of interest 
is the absence of a witness list. Such an absence would in normal circumstances suggest a 
privy seal letter (in other words a preliminary document produced as an instruction to the 
king‘s clerks to produce a final and authoritative document under the great seal).
22
 It is 
not clear which seal was appended to this document, but the use of a document without a 
witness list as an apparently ‗final‘ document, suitable for sending to the king of France 
and intended to bring about a drastic change in Scotland‘s relations with France and 
England, must be considered very unusual.  
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 This lack of a witness list links to a number of further points. First, the 
introductory phrase to the letter – ‗Omnibus has litteras visuris uel audituris, Dauid Dei 
gracia . . .‘ – is entirely unique in David II‘s reign in a document made in the king‘s name 
and addressed publicly, and may not have been used in a royal document of this sort since 
very early in the reign of Robert I. The only exception to this rule is private letters to 
particular individuals of very high political or religious status, particularly forign 
monarchs, the pope and leading prelates, on which occasion the monarch or prelate would 
be named before the Scottish king. These, however, were an entirely different class of 
correspondance, and leave the letter of 10 May 1359 in a unique position.
23
 In all other 
surviving royal documents addressed publicly the king‘s name begins the text (‗Dauid 
Dei gracia ...‘).24 The form of phrasing used in the May 1359 letter was quite normal, 
however, in documents made in the name of a noble, and equally when a noble was acting 
on the king‘s behalf.25 It is therefore significant that the nearest parallel to this letter, in 
terms of language and intended purpose, is Robert Steward‘s letter as King‘s Lieutenant 
of 17 January 1357 appointing ambassadors to treat for the release of David II from 
England.
26
 In fact, apart from the replacement of the Steward‘s name with the king‘s, the 
opening clauses of the 1357 letter are largely the same in terminology and meaning 
(‗Omnibus has litteras . . . . Nouerit vniversitas vestra quod . . .‘), and it goes on to 
appoint ambassadors in a manner roughly comparable to the 1359 letter. As a result it 
seems probable that the scribe in 1359 had used the 1357 letter as a template. This, in 
turn, may support the notion of the Steward‘s predominance at the time the 1359 letter 
was made. 
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Second, the description of the seal as ‗sigillum nostrum autenticum‘ is almost 
without parallel in a royal document in David‘s reign. Autenticum is virtually unheard of 
as a term to describe the seal in royal documents, indeed it is very rare phrase in non-royal 
documents in the years around 1359.
27
 It is, however, found in at least one other royal 
document, on this occasion under the great seal: an undated record of a decision of 
Parliament perhaps produced in the days before David II died on 22 February 1371 and 
almost certainly after the Perth Parliament of October 1370.
28
 The return to the use of this 
word in late 1370 or early 1371 may be no coincidence. With the king perhaps ailing, the 
Steward may already taken control of some of the reins of government. Certainly the 
presence of not only the Steward but also, more unusually, his son, John earl of Carrick, 
at the October Parliament and as a witness to the undated letter suggest they were taking 
an increasingly prominent role in royal affairs in the last weeks and months of David II‘s 
life.29 This may also explain why the Steward is accorded such unusual prominence in the 
document, which is specifically permitted by his ‗consent and assent‘. If, therefore, his 
officers had already entered the royal chancery before David‘s death, it may be no 
coincidence that a return to this phraseology was made at this time. In other words it 
might be suggested tentatively that the word ‗autenticum‘ was familiar to the scribe from 
previous work for the Steward, and that he was unaware of the different procedure of the 
royal chancery, or made an error resulting from habit.30 
The final peculiarity suggests some confusion in the drafting of the letter. While 
written in David II‘s name, and generally using the normal royal first person plural, in the 
middle of the text it suddenly refers to the king as ‗prefatus dominus rex Scocie uel locum 
eius tenens [the aforesaid king of Scotland or his lieutenant]‘ where grammatical sense 
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and the usual practice of such documents demands ‗we or our lieutenant‘.31 Together 
these oddities suggest that not only did the scribe in 1359 use the Steward‘s document as 
a template, but also that he was unfamiliar with the usual form of royal letters and made 
some elementary mistakes. Was he, in other words, the Steward‘s scribe? 
 Yet, although the 1359 letter had been based on the Steward‘s 1357 letter, it 
differed in one important respect. The 1357 letter had been a very public act, with a large 
witness list, made in full Council at Perth in the name ‗of all the prelates, nobles and the 
whole community of the kingdom of Scotland‘, and under the Steward‘s seal and the 
seals of representatives of the prelates, nobles and burgesses.32 This was a far more usual 
form than that of the 1359 letter, which, although giving authority to the ambassadors to 
make obligations which would be binding upon king and community, was not made with 
the permission of the latter. Embassies and diplomatic matters, in the context of the 1350s 
and 1360s as at other times, were expected to be authorised publicly, before the 
assembled community and in full Council or Parliament — the 1359 letter breaks this 
expectation.
33
 In short, the peculiar nature of the 1359 letter supports the notion that the 
Steward and those with him in Edinburgh castle were forcing David II to issue diplomatic 




Letters of David II appointing Ambassadors to France to renew the Franco-Scottish 





Omnibus has litteras visuris uel audituris Dauid Dei gracia rex Scottorum salutem in 
Domino sempiternam. Nouerit universitas vestra quod cum quedam confederacio amiticie 
inter illustres reges Francie et progenitorem nostrum ac nos populumque ipsorum et 
nostrorum ab olim facta fuit et inuiolabiliter diucius observata, nos cupientes eam futuris 
temporibus firmiter persistere, damus et concedimus per presentes dilectis et fidelibus 
secretariis nostris Roberto de Erskyn, consanguineo nostro, et Johanni le Graunt, 
militibus, ac Normanno de Lesley, armigero nostro, presentium exhibitoribus, et eorum 
duobus, de quorum circumspectione et fidelitate plenam habemus fiduciam, potestatem 
plenam, liberam et generalem ac mandatum speciale dictam confederationem pro nobis 
prelatis, proceribus et communitate dicti regni nostri Scocie renovandi, ampliandi et ad 
ipsius melioracionem et observanciam firmiorem punctos ac articulos in ea addendi, 
nosque, dictos prelatos, proceres et communitatem regni nostri ad observacionem ipsius 
renovacionis et ampliacionis punctorum et articulorum additorum, tam per juramenta in 
manum nostram quam ipsorum prestenda quam aliter, obligandi eciam si mandatum 
exigant speciale; ita tamen quod prefatus dominus rex Scocie uel locum eius
35
 tenens aut 
aliquis alius uel alii potestatem sufficientem ad hoc ab eisdem habens vel habentes 
consimilem renovacionem et
36
 ampliacionem punctorum et articulorum additorum per 
omnia et in omnibus nobis faciant et ad consimilem ipsorum firmam observacionem se 
nobis obligent per omnem modum supradictum ratum et gratum habentes et habituros 
quicquid dicti Robertus, Johannes et Normannus, vel eorum duo, fecerint in premissis et 
quolibet premissorum. In cuius rei testimonium sigillum nostrum autenticum
37
 




To everyone who shall see or hear these letters, David by the grace of God king of Scots, 
eternal greeting in the lord. Know all of you that, since a certain alliance of friendship 
between the illustrious kings of France and our progenitor and our people was formerly 
made by them and ours and inviolably observed for a long time, we, desiring this to 
persist firmly in future times, give and grant by the present letters to our beloved and 
faithful confidential representatives Robert of Erskine, our kinsman, and John le Grant, 
knights, and Norman of Lesley, our esquire, the bearers of these letters, and any two of 
them, of whose circumspection and faithfulness we have full confidence, full, free and 
general power and special mandate for renewing [and] enlarging the said alliance for us, 
our prelates, nobles and the community of our said kingdom of Scotland, and of binding 
ourselves and the said prelates, nobles and the community of our kingdom, either by oaths 
on our soul, by their sureties, or in other ways, to observe the same renewal and the 
enlargement of additional points and articles, even if they require a special mandate; with 
this proviso, that the aforesaid king of Scotland or his lieutenant, or any other person or 
persons who hold sufficient authority for this [delegated by] them, may make a similar 
renewal and enlargement of the added points and articles by and in all respects on our 
behalf, and bind themselves in all the above to a similar strict observance of them, 
holding and to hold as ratified and pleasing whatever the said Robert, John and Norman, 
or any two of them, shall do in the fore-mentioned [matters] and each of the fore-
mentioned. In testimony of which we have caused our authentic seal to be appended to 
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